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.Early vehicles were fitted with the same 10-R simplex (unidirectional) lampheterodyne short-wave radio as had been used in the T-34/76 from the beginning ofthe war.It operated between 3.75 and 6MHz with a voice range of up to 24km when thevehicle was stationary (16km when moving), with non-vocal communication such asMorse code used as an alternative.As was common, the device comprised a separatetransmitter and receiver, each with a rotary transformer, which were mounted on arubber-bushed shock pad.Most IS-2s contained an improved, more easily produced10-RK radio, which offered the same ranges, and allowed for the smooth selection ofoperating frequencies, often with an accompanying 4m umbrella antenna.32© Osprey Publishing " www.ospreypublishing.com THE STRATEGICSITUATIONGERMANY ON THE STRATEGIC DEFENSIVEFollowing the encirclement and destruction of Axis forces at Stalingrad, Soviet forcesspent the next two years conducting an inexorable strategic advance that recaptured allof their lost territory, and continued beyond their pre-1939 borders into EasternEurope.Supplied with substantial Lend/Lease logistical assets, especially badly neededtransport, the Red Army were frequently able to concentrate overwhelming numbersof men and machines at sectors and times of their choosing.Their effective use ofmaskiróvka ( deceptive measures ) and a growing level of operational experience meantthat the Germans were often forced to react to an unexpected or unfavorable situation.With Soviet forces seemingly in strength everywhere along the front German commandand control could not consistently or effectively prioritize and address threats and theircombat formations were frequently forced to withdraw or risk destruction.During the summer of 1944 this scenario occurred on a grand scale where the SovietBagration offensive virtually annihilated Army Group Center.Hitler s belief that theRed Army would try to use their recent acquisition of the western Ukraine as aspringboard from which to attack into Romania, Hungary, and southern Polandprompted him to reposition much of his armor south to contest such a move.Instead,the Soviets launched a devastating offensive further north that drove a massive wedgeinto Belorussia.Unable to regain their strategic balance following Stalingrad and Kursk,33the Ostheer ( East Army ) traded space for time, while they tried to re-establish adequate© Osprey Publishing " www.ospreypublishing.com defenses and solidify the front.To compound their difficulties, Hitler continuallyinterfered with the war s conduct and the actions of experienced commanders on thespot.By acting as both Supreme Commander and head of the OKH (Army HighCommand, in charge of the Eastern Front), his authority was unencumbered by otheropinions, with predictably disastrous battlefield results.Had the German General Staffbeen employed as the primary military decision-making entity for which it wasestablished, such a desperate situation might well have been avoided.THE LOSS OF POLANDHitler, continuing to rely heavily on intuition, believed that the Soviets next greatoffensive would be against his East Prussian and Hungarian flanks.The head ofFremde Heere Ost (Foreign Armies East), Generalmajor Reinhard Gehlen,disagreed.His position within Army Intelligence overwhelmingly indicated that theRed Army would instead attempt to capture Berlin and much of central Europe beforethe western Allies were in a position to contest it.This seemingly indisputable evidenceon Red Army dispositions and intentions was passed to Army Chief of StaffGeneraloberst Heinz Guderian, and then to Hitler who promptly refuted theassessment.Although outwardly Hitler expressed his belief that the battlefield situationwas a Soviet ruse, in fact the Führer s longstanding dislike of Gehlen s direct mannerand pessimistic view of Germany s present ability to offer effective resistance meant thefindings were not acted upon.As a consequence, Marshal Georgy Zhukov s 1stBelorussian and Marshal Ivan Konev s 1st Ukrainian Fronts were able to capitalize ontheir achievement against far less opposition than would have otherwise been possible.In mid-January 1945 the pair were able to quickly overrun Poland and establish severalA crewman working withsmall bridgeheads across the Oder River from near Stargard to south of Breslau.a broken-nose, narrow-mantlet IS-2 s muzzle-brakeTo help stem the flood of Soviet forces moving across Poland, Guderian proposed thecover.Such protection wouldcreation of an emergency army group to bolster the much weakened Army Groupbe used in transport to keepCenter (soon renamed Army Group North).On January 24, Hitler gave his approval,dust and debris from enteringbut instead of an experienced commander, he assigned Reichsführer-SS Heinrichthe barrel.Note the femalesoldier atop the turret.(DML) Himmler to the task, proclaiming that his long-time henchman s exceptional skills atadministration and motivation would soon stabilize thesituation.In addition to being the head of all branchesof the Schutzstaffel (SS), including the Waffen-SS,Himmler had also been put in charge of theReplacement Army following the attempted July 20,1944 assassination of Hitler by members of the Army [ Pobierz caÅ‚ość w formacie PDF ]