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.Thus he explains that he uses theterm passion in a broad sense: Passion is not quite the right wordfor what I am trying to express.I use it here to denote any human Philosophy of History 269activity that is governed by particular interests, special aims, or, ifyou will, by selfish intentions. (VG 85/72).Hegel s demotion of moral idealism, and his promotion of self-interest, raise the inevitable question: When and how do indi-viduals become conscious of the goals of history? Surely, they mustbe conscious of them at some point, because Hegel insists that theends of reason are realized only through individuals, and they couldhardly be said to realize them if they were never aware of them atall.It is in answering this question that Hegel states that othernotorious theme of his philosophy of history: the world-historicalindividual (VG 97 103/82 9).These are men like Socrates, Luther,Caesar and Napoleon.They alone have the rare power to rise abovethe limited horizon of their own age, to see where history is head-ing, and to realize a higher stage in the self-awareness of freedom.They are the leaders of others, who have no power to resistthem and who rally around their banner (VG 99/84).Althoughthey do not have the precise knowledge of the philosopher becausethey are men of action, they still have the power to grasp the newneeds of the age and to see what has to be done to satisfy them (VG98/83).It is only in the case of world-historical individuals that Hegelseems to allow some degree of moral idealism in the realization ofhistory.For he says that these individuals identify themselves withtheir causes: .what they want is the universal; this is their pathos. (VG 101/86).He objects to those who would reduce theirmotives to something purely self-interested or personal, such ashonor and glory.Thus to Goethe s famous maxim No one is a heroto his valet he adds the explanation that this is because the valet is avalet and not because the hero is not really a hero (VG 103/87 8).But even here we are warned not to regard these heroes as moralidealists; for they too still act more from passion than principle,and they do not let moral scruples stand in the path of their mission: Great men want to satisfy themselves, not the well-meaningintentions of others (VG 104/89). 270 HegelIf these doctrines seem to remove some of the difficulties withHegel s philosophy of history, they seem to create others all theirown.The cunning of reason seems to encourage fatalism.For ifreason realizes itself through self-interest, why should I attempt tobe moral at all? If reason realizes itself through all my actions, whyshould I be a responsible citizen? Both doctrines seem to support analmost brutal Realpolitik, undermining the claims of morality in thepolitical sphere.Thus Hegel tells us that world history operates on ahigher plane than morality, that we should not measure historicalnecessity by moral ideals, and that reason uses people as meremeans for its ends.There are several passages in his lectures whereHegel acknowledges the infinite right of subjectivity, the value ofeach and every individual life; but these ring hollow in the face ofhis callous statement that the world-historical individual musttrample many an innocent flower underfoot, and destroy much thatlies in its path (VG 105/89).Yet for all its fatalism and amoralism, there is still a sense inwhich the cunning of reason is still profoundly moralistic.Thewhole purpose of the concept is to show that reason ultimatelytriumphs over moral cynicism after all, for it states that reason ismore cunning than the most clever practitioner of Realpolitik(p.220).Even in pursuing raison d état the statesman will be thevehicle of the highest end of reason: the self-awareness that man assuch is free.THE PROBLEM OF EVILIn his lectures on world history Hegel identifies his central thesisthat reason governs the world with the traditional Christian idea ofprovidence (VG 77/67).He likens the reason that rules history tothe divine plan behind it, as if reason arose from the will of God.The fundamental task of the philosophy of world history, heexplains, is to comprehend that God governs the world.For worldhistory consists in nothing more than the content of his governmentand the execution of [the divine] plan (VG 77/67). Philosophy of History 271Although Hegel attempts to reinstate the traditional idea ofprovidence, he also gives it an entirely immanent or this-worldlymeaning.According to the Christian tradition, life on earth is only ameans toward a higher end: eternal salvation.History is only apilgrimage, a trial of passage, on the road toward the city of God.True to his immanent theology, Hegel denies that there is a super-natural realm lying beyond history that gives it purpose, meaningor value.Since the end of history does not lie beyond it, redemptionhas to be achieved in history itself.The fundamental problem for any belief in providence whether immanent or transcendent is the existence of evil [ Pobierz caÅ‚ość w formacie PDF ]